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Disqualification of Counsel: The Westinghouse Litigation,  
by Anthony D'Amato,* 61(no.2) Chicago Bar Record, 88, 90-94, 96, 98-101 (1979) 
 
Abstract: The motion to disqualify counsel is becoming increasingly important in pre-trial strategy. Discusses 
one case arising out of Westinghouse Electric Corporation's alleged breach of long-term uranium supply contracts, 
in which a disqualification motion was sustained against Westinghouse's counsel, Kirkland & Ellis. 
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 [pg88]** The motion to disqualify counsel is becoming increasingly important in pre-
trial strategy.  “It can delay a trial, embarrass an opponent, and, if successful, deprive an 
adversary of his chosen and well-prepared counsel.”FN1 In one of several gargantuan cases 
arising out of Westinghouse Electric Corporation's alleged breach of long-term uranium supply 
contracts, a disqualification motion was sustained against Westinghouse's counsel, Kirkland & 
Ellis, a large two-city law firm numbering more than 130 lawyers in Chicago and about forty 
lawyers in Washington D.C.FN2 In this particular case, Westinghouse as plaintiff was alleging 
that twelve foreign and seventeen domestic corporations involved in the uranium industry 
conspired in restraint of trade to raise worldwide uranium prices. Among the defendants were 
four companies which moved to disqualify Kirkland; Gulf Oil Corporation, Kerr-McGee 
Corporation and Getty Oil Company, on the ground that Kirkland was simultaneously acting as 
their counsel by virtue of representing the American Petroleum Institute of which they were 
members; and Noranda Mines Limited, on the ground that nine years previously 
Kirkland had represented Noranda in several unrelated matters. Both the district court 
(Judge Prentice H. Marshall) and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Fairchild, Sprecher and 
Bauer, JJ) had little difficulty dismissing the latter motion by Noranda. But the court of appeals 
reversed Judge Marshall's dismissal of the oil companies' motion, in effect disqualifying 
Kirkland. (Westinghouse theoretically could have chosen to retain Kirkland and drop the three 
oil companies from the list of defendants, but the other defendants would have then charged 
that they were prejudiced by the dismissal of the oil company co-defendants.) Kirkland's 
petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was denied.FN3 
 
 Since it is unlikely that any well-established law firm would proceed on behalf of a 
client knowing that it had an ethical problem in that representation, the result in the 
Westinghouse case obviously must have taken Kirkland by surprise. The court's reasoning in 
the case should therefore be of considerable interest to the practicing bar. There were three 
important issues regarding the oil company defendants: 
 
 First, there was the apparent conflict in the positions that Kirkland was taking. In 
representing the Petroleum Institute, Kirkland was arguing that oil companies' diversification 
into uranium production was good for competition, whereas in representing [pg90] 
Westinghouse against the oil companies, Kirkland was perforce arguing that the oil companies 
participated in a cartel that stifled competition. Was Kirkland taking a contradictory stand and, 
if so, what of it? 
 
 Second, Kirkland's Washington office was handling the Petroleum Institute, whereas the 
Westinghouse antitrust action was being prepared by Kirkland's Chicago office. Could Kirkland 
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argue that a large law firm may often find itself representing adverse interests and that therefore 
what really matters is whether there has been actual communication between the two sets of 
lawyers? Was it possible that in this case a “Chinese Wall” existed between the Washington 
and Chicago offices of Kirkland, barring prejudicial communication between them? 
  
 Third, although Kirkland was concededly counsel for the Petroleum Institute, did that 
representation “automatically create an attorney-client relationship” between Kirkland and the 
8,000 odd members of the Petroleum Institute, three of whom were the oil companies seeking 
Kirkland's disqualification?FN4 More broadly, can the requirement of confidentiality arise 
when a law firm has not consented to be counsel for the movant (the three oil companies in this 
case) and has not been retained by the movant?  
 





 The oil companies seeking to disqualify Kirkland made much of the fact that in 
representing the Petroleum Institute Kirkland was supporting a lobbying position which 
encouraged oil company diversification into alternate energy sources such as uranium, since 
thereby competition would be enhanced across all fronts—whereas in representing 
Westinghouse at the same time Kirkland was contending that uranium producers, including the 
oil companies, had conspired to destroy competition in uranium marketing and pricing. The 
trial judge took prominent note of these “inconsistent positions” although he eventually held for 
Kirkland,FN5 whereas the appellate court was not troubled by the inconsistency although in the 
end it reversed the case and disqualified Kirkland.  
 
 On the particular issue of inconsistent advocacy positions, the appellate court's brushing 
aside of the matter seems justifiable for two reasons. In the first place, contrary to Judge 
Marshall's view of the matter at the trial level, the positions taken by Kirkland do not appear 
inconsistent with each other. Oil company diversification into uranium production may or may 
not promote competition with respect to uranium, but that issue is a general one, quite unrelated 
to whether specific uranium  producers—including oil companies that have branched into 
uranium—have in fact engaged in a particular conspiracy to raise uranium prices and hold back 
uranium supplies. Indeed, since most uranium producers are not also engaged in oil production, 
it would appear to be hard, even theoretically, to relate oil company diversification plans to any 
alleged cartel among uranium suppliers. This point will become relevant in another connection 
later, when we consider the nature of [pg91] the confidential information that served as the 
basis for Kirkland's disqualification.  
 
 Second, even if Kirkland were taking inconsistent positions on the merits of this or any 
other issue, would there be any ethical consequences?  Would there even be an “appearance of 
professional impropriety” in the language of Canon 9 of the American Bar Association's Code 
of Professional Responsibility? When a person says he believes one thing and then shortly  
afterward says he believes the opposite, his listeners may be justified in thinking that he has  
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lied at least once and maybe both times. But consider an attorney acting in his or her 
professional capacity. In advocating a position, that attorney is definitely not saying that he or 
she believes in that position, any more than a member of a college debate team is asserting his 
or her personal belief on the assigned debate topic. For example, in representing a criminal 
defendant known to the attorney to be guilty, the attorney clearly is not asserting his or her own 
belief in the defendant's innocence. Of course, sometimes the public has to be reminded of this, 
or “educated” about it. There have been several notorious cases in criminal history where a 
particularly effective defense has led to the acquittal of a person who later admitted guilt; often 
there was a public outcry about the “ethics” of the defense attorney for making such a 
“persuasive” case to the jury. These cases at best serve as learning experiences for the public; 
how else could every accused person be assured of defense counsel if counsel's personal beliefs 
would serve as a disqualification? Similarly, a lawyer paid to advocate a position is simply 
presenting an argument which the hearer can accept or reject on its merits and apart from the 
personal beliefs of the advocate. In 1906 Louis Brandeis argued in behalf of United Shoe 
Machinery Company that tying clauses were legal under the Sherman Act; a few years later, 
having left United, he publicly argued with great fervor that such clauses were illegal under 
existing law. Although he was highly [pg92] criticized for his “inconsistent positions” at the 
time, the message he was really imparting to the public was this:  Pay attention to the 
arguments and not to who is making them, for what really counts is what you decide on the 
merits; otherwise you are, in effect, delegating your own decision-making ability to the 
spokesman who most impresses you with his apparent sincerity. 
 
 
The “Chinese Wall” 
 
 On the assumption that Kirkland's Washington office received confidential information 
from the oil companies in the course of representing the Petroleum Institute, should that 
information be imputed to Kirkland's Chicago office, which was simultaneously preparing an 
antitrust case against the oil companies? Judge Marshall's opinion at the district court level 
cited Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York : “Since the largest firms represent 
the largest corporations with interests in all sectors of the economy, it is almost impossible to 
have an important client or its subsidiary avoid some kind of legal relationship with another 
client at some time.”FN6 Judge Marshall found factually that no reported communication 
passed between Kirkland's Washington and Chicago offices with respect to the oil companies. 
Furthermore, he noted that affidavits filed in the case stated that no Petroleum Institute data 
received by the Kirkland lawyers in Washington were ever disclosed to the attorneys for 
Westinghouse in Chicago, and found that these affidavits “are sufficient to support a conclusion 
that no disclosure of confidences occurred.”FN7 Of course, the judge noted, “An attorney 
should not place himself in a position where he will or might be tempted to take advantage of 
information derived from confidential interviews,”FN8 and hence found that Kirkland's 
decision to represent Westinghouse against the oil companies was “an error in professional 
judgment”FN9 and “a minor ethical grievance.”FN10  But he held that disqualification 
of Kirkland would be “drastic, unjustified, and inequitable” in light of the “fairly remote” 




 Clearly this “Chinese  wall” argument relied upon by Kirkland at the trial level was 
instrumental in persuading judge Marshall to deny the motion for disqualification, but in 
winning the trial-level battle Kirkland might have lost the appellate-level war. For the “Chinese 
Wall” argument was wide open to the damaging and archly phrased rebuttal by Getty Oil 
Company on appeal: that Judge Marshall's decision was “nothing more than a holding that large 
law firms in complex litigation will be held to a lower standard of ethics than will smaller firms 
who act in simpler cases.”FN12 To add insult to injury, Getty continued with the telling 
argument that even if the Chinese wall were intact up to the present moment, to allow Kirkland 
to continue as Westinghouse's counsel was to invite the possibility that the wall could be 
breached at any future point in the course of the Westinghouse litigation against the oil 
companies. The court of appeals was, unsurprisingly, convinced. It held that there is no basis 
for creating separate disqualification rules for large firms.”FN13 
 
 [pg94] Kirkland might have been well advised to forget the Chinese wall argument at 
the trial level, even though the kinds of conflicts envisaged by Judge Weinstein (quoted above 
by Judge Marshall were real and potentially damaging to large law firms. For at the most 
fundamental level the attractiveness of a large law firm is its ability to bring its members' broad 
and varied expertise to bear upon any individual client's problem. This is an obvious advantage 
that even a two-person law partnership has over the solo practitioner. Any firm, whether 
consisting of two partners or two hundred, is in effect holding out to the public a unified, 
internally communicative resource group. Without such internal communication and pooling of 
talents, there would be no public justification for a number of lawyers to hold themselves out as 
a firm of lawyers. Thus Westinghouse, in hiring Kirkland to file its antitrust case, would even 
have a right to expect that if Kirkland had some attorneys in Washington who were experts in 
the oil-uranium field, these attorneys would be called upon to help in the litigation. (Of course 
Westinghouse in fact might choose to waive that right, but in general the right is the same for 
any person who engages a law firm as to any case.) If such rightful expectation makes it 
difficult for a firm to grow bigger and bigger, if inevitable conflicts exert a pressure upon large 
law firms to restrict their growth, and if such pressures occasionally result in disqualification 
from a major case involving fees that could run into the millions of dollars, as presumably 
occurred in the Westinghouse case for Kirkland—then such constraints will have to be 
accepted. There is no ethical rule that suggests law firms should grow bigger and bigger, but 
there is an ethical rule that suggests a client has the right to the undivided loyalty of all the 
members of a firm—for the simple reason that this is what a law firm holds itself to provide. 
 
 Although Kirkland largely backed away from the Chinese wall argument on appeal, the 
stress on that argument at the trial level and the trial judge's findings on the point inevitably 
served to shape expectations at the appellate level. The case thus seemed to focus upon the 
“confidential information” which, under the Chinese wall theory, was never imparted to the 
Chicago office and which, under the next theory that we shall discuss, was or was not part of 
the attorney-client relationship. What tended to get lost in the shuffle was the precise 
relevance, even if disclosed, of the “confidential information” to the anti-trust case instituted by 
Westinghouse. But since that matter was minimized, let us turn first to the theory of whether 





Was There an Attorney-Client Relationship? 
 
 Kirkland's major contention on appeal was that it had no attorney-client relationship 
with the oil companies seeking to disqualify Kirkland from the Westinghouse case. Therefore 
Kirkland could breach no duty to them with respect to any information its Washington office 
might have received in the course of representing the Petroleum  Institute. To examine [pg95] 
this contention, we must now delve in greater detail into the facts of the case. 
 
 Kirkland was retained in 1976 by the American Petroleum Institute to prepare 
a report of legal arguments that could be used in API's lobbying efforts against legislative 
proposals in Congress which were designed to break up oil companies by requiring divestiture 
of their alternative energy resources, such as uranium and coal. Part of Kirkland's job was to 
interview some of API's member companies, including the three movants in the instant case—
Gulf, Kerr-McGee and Getty. The Kirkland lawyers were introduced to the member companies 
by a memorandum stating that Kirkland “is acting as an independent special counsel for API, 
and will hold any company information in strict confidence, not to be disclosed to any other 
company, or even to API, except in aggregated or such other form as will preclude identifying 
the source company with its data.” Kirkland attorneys then interviewed Gulf and Kerr-McGee 
officials personally and Getty by means of a written questionnaire only. Some of the questions 
the attorneys prepared for discussion during the interviews  (which were presumably asked 
of the oil company officials) include the following:  
 
 Would your divestiture of alternative energy businesses violate any contractual 
provisions of your loan or debenture agreements? Other contractual agreements? If so, 
which? 
 
 Do you know of any oil or gas companies that have lower cost alternative 
sources of energy that they are not developing?  
 
 Have the oil companies blocked coal liquefaction research?  
 
 Is the uranium industry competitive? Is that industry becoming more or less 
competitive? 
 
 Are the oil companies aiding uranium production?  
 
 Have oil companies increased their holdings of uranium reserves faster than they 
have increased uranium production?  
 
 Although Kirkland sent its legal bills to API and was compensated only by API, 
affidavits submitted at the trial (quite after the fact, of course) stated that Gulf’s counsel in 
Washington “was given to believe that the Kirkland firm was representing both API and Gulf,” 
that Kerr-McGee’s vice-president understood a Kirkland partner to have explained that 
Kirkland was working on behalf of API and also its members such as Kerr-McGee, and that 
Getty's vice-president submitted data to Kirkland “upon the belief and expectation” that 
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Kirkland needed the data “to render legal service to Getty in furtherance of Getty’s 
interests.”FN14 
 
 Kirkland's final report to API was released on October 15, 1976, and, fortuitously or 
not, on that same day Kirkland's Chicago’s office filed its anti-trust suit on behalf of 
Westinghouse. The report to API contained 230 pages of text and 82 pages of exhibits. 
It asserted, among other things, that the relatively high concentration ratios in the uranium 
industry could be expected to decline, that current increases in uranium prices were a result of 
increasing demand, that oil company entry into uranium production [pg96] had stimulated 
competition and diminished concentration, that oil companies had no incentive to act in concert 
to restrict coal or uranium production, and that the historical record refuted any charge that oil 
companies had restricted uranium output. (Parenthetically, we might note that this report—on 
its face, and especially the last clause of this summary—tends to support Kirkland's Chinese 
wall theory, inasmuch as the preparers of the report in Kirkland's Washington office would 
probably be surprised by the antitrust suit coming out of Chicago against the oil companies. ) 
 
 Kirkland's argument that the above facts do not amount to a lawyer-client relationship 
between Kirkland and the oil companies was based on a strict interpretation of the law of 
agency. Kirkland did not consent to be the oil companies' attorney, submitted no bill to them, 
and was not paid by them; and all the contemporaneous documents prepared in connection with 
the API report stated that Kirkland was retained by API and made no reference to API members 
as Kirkland's clients. But, as the court of appeals said, the trial court's acceptance of the 
Kirkland argument applied a “narrow, formal agency approach to determining the attorney- 
client relation.”FN15 Yet isn't the attorney-client relationship one of agency? The answer is that 
it may be for certain purposes but one must be especially careful when a matter of legal ethics is 
involved. When we have a matter of ethics or professional responsibility, a paramount 
consideration must be that by definition the lay person seeking advice does not know what the 
law is, and hence any lawyer talking with a lay person cannot reasonably expect to be shielded 
by particularistic rules of agency (or any other area of law) which the lawyer knows but the 
layman does not know. The very sensitivity of the attorney-client relationship requires a most 
liberal interpretation of the boundaries of that relationship. Indeed, the boundaries extend well 
beyond the precise relationship itself. For example, suppose a person walks into a law office 
seeking advice and an attorney, after listening to his story, turns the case down. Then, even 
though that person certainly is not a “client,” nevertheless what he has revealed to the attorney 
is fully protected by attorney-client confidentiality.FN16 Kirkland tried unsuccessfully to argue 
on appeal that Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (“A Lawyer Should Preserve 
the Confidences and Secrets of a Client”) plainly applies only to the benefit of a present or 
former client of the attorney.FN17 Clearly this would be a narrow, if not stultifying, view of 
professional ethics, and it was properly rejected by the court of appeals. 
 
 As the court put it in the instant case, the attorney-client relationship can arise “when 
the lay party submits confidential information to the law party with reasonable belief that the 
latter is acting as the former's attorney”.FN18 In a sense the word “reasonable” begs the 
question, for the Kirkland position might arguably be that it would be unreasonable in any case 
to expect that the law party is one's attorney if nothing is said before or afterward about fees, 
and indeed if the lay party has no [pg98] intention of paying the attorney. But apart from 
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begging the question, Kirkland in fact argued that the oil companies were represented by top 
executives as well as by their own legal counsel in the interviews, and they could hardly have 
believed that Kirkland was acting as their attorney, Moreover, they were aware that Kirkland 
was representing Westinghouse in matters growing out of the uranium supply contracts (though 
not, of course, that Kirkland was preparing an antitrust suit on behalf of Westinghouse), and 
this too should have put them on notice that Kirkland was not acting as their attorney, Finally, 
in all the contemporaneous documents Westinghouse was referred to as “special counsel for 
API”. How, then, could the court of appeals find that Kirkland was disqualified in the 
Westinghouse antitrust case with respect to the defendant oil companies? 
  
 One line of attack was that API was simply an umbrella title for its members, who pay 
all its costs including costs of counsel. But this approach would prove too much; it would mean 
that Kirkland would find itself attorney for 350 major corporate and 7,500 individual members 
in taking on API as a client. The result would be that API might find it impossible to hire any 
moderately large law firm because of conflicts of interest that could arise. Although some cases 
have held that each member of an unincorporated  association is a client of the association's 
lawyer,FN19 the court of appeals avoided resting its decision on this ground.  
 
 A second approach, which the court did adopt, was to find that a “fiduciary obligation or 
an implied professional relation” existed between Kirkland and the oil companies on the basis 
of the facts of the case.FN20 Note that the court was not labeling this a “lawyer-client 
relationship.” Nevertheless the “implied professional relation” was sufficient to disqualify 
Kirkland.  
 
 Apparently, the decisive factor from the court's standpoint was that Kirkland, in 
soliciting confidences from API members came to them wearing its legal hat. “Kirkland did not 
disavow its capacity as attorneys,” the court held, “but came expressly represented as lawyers. 
FN21 But, then, is there no limit to this “implied professional relation”? The court said that the 
relationship does not arise when one consults an attorney “in a capacity other than as an 
attorney.”FN22 Yet, realistically, when does anyone—other than a personal friend—consult an 
attorney in a capacity other than as an attorney? It would be very difficult for an attorney to 
demonstrate that any advice he or she gives in the course of a business day is in a non-attorney 
capacity. In other words, there are practically no bounds to the “implied professional relation” 
with respect to the attorney's capacity as an attorney.  
 
 However, there is a second aspect to the “implied professional relation” test—the 
receipt by an attorney of confidential information from the lay party. (The court talks about 
“soliciting” confidences, but surely an unsolicited confidence can equally trigger the “implied 
professional relation” test—as when a person tries to engage an attorney, the attorney says he 
does not want to hear any more since he will not take the case, and yet the [pg99] person 
persists in volunteering additional confidential information.) But the court's test, while not 
impossibly broad, is potentially applicable in all cases in which confidential information was 
received by an attorney. The potential for many disqualification motions in the wake of the 
Westinghouse case is thus formidable indeed. Attorneys in all firms, large or small, will now be 
on notice that an apparently harmless activity, such as the preparation of a report, could lead to 
the receipt of confidential information, thereby disqualifying the firm from proceeding in 
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litigation against the sender of the confidential information. The very breadth of this danger of 
disqualification, in light of the Westinghouse case, would suggest that future courts will narrow 





 It would appear that the court in the Westinghouse case was largely taken in by 
appearances. Clearly it was troubled by Kirkland coming on as an attorney and soliciting 
confidences from the oil company defendants who were members of the Petroleum Institute, 
then suing those same oil companies for antitrust violations. But appearances can be deceptive.  
A criminal defense attorney may give a powerful summation statement to a jury on behalf of a 
client he knows is guilty. If we went on the basis of appearances alone, we might say such  
a lawyer was unethical. This and many other instances that could be mentioned indicate  
that for resolving a matter of legal ethics we must look below the surface.FN23  
 
 Unfortunately, the court of appeals was not helped by the briefs of the parties. Kirkland 
in particular submitted highly unsophisticated briefs in the case, focusing on narrow agency 
rules for the determination of the lawyer-client relationship, relying on Chinese walls, and in 
general treating a matter of ethics the same way one would treat a technicality in the Uniform 
Commercial Code. To a large extent the substandard performances of many firms in cases 
involving the Code of Professional Responsibility are due to the lack of any exposure to legal 
ethics as a subject in law school. Now that legal ethics is becoming a more serious part of the 
curriculum of the leading law schools, one would hope that future cases involving questions of 
legal ethics will be better argued by attorneys and decided on more sophisticated grounds by 
courts.  
 
 In the Westinghouse case what seems crucial is not that Kirkland received confidential 
information from the oil companies, but rather the nature of the confidential information that 
was received. Did the information relate at all to the antirust case? The report that Kirkland 
filed on behalf of API certainly seems to suggest that the Kirkland attorneys in the Washington 
office did not have the remotest idea that the oil companies might be involved in a cartel to 
restrict the supply of uranium. Nor would it appear probable that the oil companies ever 
disclosed any such information to the Kirkland attorneys; conspiracies in restraint of trade are 
not blurted out to any stranger who walks in the door. If anything, one might reasonably  
suppose that the oil companies went out of their way to [pg100] “sell” the Kirkland attorneys 
on how much competition was being fostered by their involvement in uranium production. It 
would appear that nothing that Kirkland received  from the oil companies, whether confidential 
or not, had any bearing on the antitrust case. If this conclusion is correct, then the “'implied 
professional relation” the court talked about should not count toward  disqualifying  Kirkland  
from this case (even though  it might count toward  disqualifying  Kirkland  from some other 
case against the oil companies, where the information received was relevant to that other case) 
FN24  
 
 But suppose for the moment that one of the oil company executives said to a Kirkland 
partner during one of the API interviews, “You might be amused to know that we're engaged 
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in a cartel to restrict the supply of uranium—this is off the record, of course.” Since we have no 
knowledge that some such statement was not made to a Kirkland lawyer, then perhaps what 
might have been said in the interviews was relevant, after all, to the Westinghouse  case. 
However, this supposition is so improbable as to deserve no weight in the motion for 
disqualification—not only because the oil company officer, by making it, could be admitting a 
continuing criminal course of conduct, but also because Kirkland could reasonably suppose 
that the oil company counsel would have had to resign rather than participate as house counsel 
in an illegal course of corporate conduct. Indeed the Kirkland attorneys, if they heard any such 
statement, might themselves not be bound to hold that statement confidential because  
it involves a continuing crime.FN25 Thus, the very statement that theoretically would prove 
relevance of the confidence to the Westinghouse antitrust case is one on which a good 
argument can be made under the Code of Professional Responsibility that it is inherently not 
confidential!  
 
 Accordingly, if we dissociate the “confidential information” received by Kirkland from 
any use in the  Westinghouse antitrust case, we are left with no substantive reason to disqualify 
Kirkland. In the same litigation the court of appeals did not sustain a motion by Noranda 
Mines Limited to disqualify Kirkland on the ground that Kirkland had represented Noranda  
nine years earlier on a different situation. But surely it is not the passage of time that is 
significant. Rather, the significance lies in the fact that Kirkland's representation of Noranda 
was on a clearly distinguishable situation. Similarly, as to the oil companies,  the court of 
appeals could have found that although there was no time gap and although “uranium” 
was one of the matters that Kirkland investigated for API, nevertheless there was no 
relationship between information received by Kirkland for API and the issues in the antitrust 
litigation. On that analysis the court should have held that Kirkland did nothing that was even  
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